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Abstract
Artist and art historian Roger Fry used Paul Gauguin’s 1896
painting, Poèmes barbares, to advertise his 1910 exhibition,
Manet and the Post-Impressionists. In Vision and Design (1920),
Fry promoted the so-called “primitive” art of Oceania and subSaharan Africa as depending on unmediated perception that he
associated with the Impressionists and Post-Impressionists.
Although Fry’s assumption of an “ultra-primitive directness of
vision” on the part of African makers ignores their own
mediating conventions, his reliance on the Vischers’ notion of
empathetic connection enhances the possibility of regarding the
cultural products of peoples foreign to the percipient with what
Paul C. Taylor terms an “ethical attentiveness that combats
reductionism and objecti cation.” Further, such a form of
attention can displace attempts to privilege European and
Eurocentric art and thought, by referring to “primitive” art and
thought, promoting recognition of their value in their own right.
Key Words
aesthetic judgment; African sculpture; decolonization; empathy
(Einfühlung); Roger Fry; Paul Gauguin; Oceania; primitive
1. Decolonizing cultural relations
Decolonization is not con ned to ending particular forms of
political rule as settlers and their metropolitan sponsors cede
authority to the Native inhabitants whom they had dominated. It
entails a purging of those attitudes that sustain the possibility of
such behavior and sanction a continuing inequitable power
relationship between colonizer and colonized.[1] Colonial
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attitudes, by which hegemonic groups continue to discount or
denigrate the thought and practice of subaltern groups, remain
an insidious characteristic of those groups that enjoy power,
even if their members proclaim their modes of inquiry to be
dedicated to the disinterested pursuit of pancultural truth.
One of the major consequences of e orts to decolonize areas of
hegemonic thought and practice is a tendency to promote
cultural isolationism. That is, various culturally distinct subaltern
communities, many, though not all, of which identify as
Indigenous, assert an identity that their members hold to be
impenetrable to members of other groups that generally enjoy
an advantage in terms of power disparity. I do not doubt that
subaltern communities have an absolute right to assert the
validity of their own cultural knowledge and practices that their
members alone are best placed to understand. Neither do I
doubt that certain aspects of such cultural knowledge and
practice should be reserved to members of those communities,
remaining beyond what it might be proper for outsiders to
inquire into. The assumption on the part of thinkers in
hegemonic societies—primarily, though not exclusively,
Westerners whom I shall henceforth term European, in the
sense of being culturally members of the worldwide European
settler diaspora—that they have an absolute right to the
knowledge of other human communities has caused untold
damage to countless such communities. Although not all
cultural appropriation is unequivocally injurious, appropriation
that amounts to intellectual despoliation, from theft to
destruction, accelerated from the onset of large-scale European
intrusion into the Americas in the early sixteenth century.
Injurious appropriation has been and continues to be conducted
worldwide.[2]
In some circumstances, Europeans have practiced appropriation
out of admiration for aspects of the cultural knowledge and
practice of colonial subjects and other subalterns. However, as
formal European empire and colonial settlement took rm hold
in large parts of the globe in the nineteenth century,
encompassing the greater part of sub-Saharan Africa, the
Americas, northwest Asia (Siberia), south Asia, and Oceania,[3]
contempt or, at best, condescension tended to displace any
earlier admiration on the part of Europeans for Indigenous
peoples. A notion of the primitive as inferior to the civilized
came to dominate hegemonic thought, implying a hierarchy
among human communities. Ancient Society (1877), by
American historian and anthropologist, Lewis H. Morgan, sets
out what was to become the dominant European notion of
social evolution.[4] Morgan proposes human progress from
savagery (characterized by the use of the bow, re, and pottery)
through barbarism (dominated by agriculture, the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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domestication of animals, and metalworking), to civilization
(which alone employs writing). Although long since superseded
in anthropological scholarship, Morgan’s model still underlies
assumptions widely held in hegemonic societies about human
social organization.
One of the most insidious and damaging aspects of European
hegemonism has been its co-option of the primitive to sanction
European achievements. From the late nineteenth century
onwards, various European thinkers, including some artists,
critics, museum curators, and art collectors, appealed to
selected artifacts from subaltern communities not as examples
of inferiority and error, as had been the case when, for example,
between 1814 and 1910 the London Missionary Society had
displayed “idols” from Oceania and elsewhere in its museum,
but as sources of inspiration.[5] Various late nineteenth and
early twentieth-century European artists responded to the
works of Indigenous makers, creating new forms. Certain critics
also discerned elements in novel European art practice that
appeared to be consonant, in terms of certain values and
practices, with characteristics of various Indigenous items, even
if they di ered in form. One such artist, curator, and critic was
Roger Fry (1866-1934). Early in the twentieth century, thinkers
such as Fry mobilized what they considered to be primitive art
to sanction the practice of certain European artists. This
indisputably drew European attention to select formal
characteristics of some subaltern items leading to their positive
aesthetic evaluation. Even though there is much to which to
object in this kind of aesthetic apprehension, in which any
European appreciation of subaltern items is solely on
hegemonic terms, it can also help lead the way to questioning
the inevitability of cultural isolation: that members of di erent
cultural communities cannot hope to have any legitimate access
whatsoever to aspects of one another’s cultural products. Even
while allowing for the danger of acquiescing in injurious
appropriation, I propose that empathy has a role to play in
fostering such access and overcoming the social isolation of
cultural groups. I shall attempt to explore this proposal by
appealing in the rst instance to some of Fry’s writings on
“primitive” art and aesthetics.
The term empathy has become unwieldy in its elasticity and
imprecision. I use it in the sense evoked by Fry, as a “feeling of a
special tie” that the percipient can come to sense between
herself or himself and the maker of an artwork, based on selfrealization prompted by the work that evokes this feeling.[6]
Fry’s emphasis on empathetic connection enhances the
possibility of regarding the cultural products of peoples foreign
to the percipient in an ethically informed manner that promotes
acknowledgement of the full human complexity of their makers.
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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Such a form of attention can promote recognition of the value of
works that remain foreign to the percipient, even though they
may have a role in sanctioning the percipient’s own culturally
familiar art and thought. Further, an acknowledgement of a
capacity for empathy promises one way of circumventing claims
that human cultural groups enjoy exclusive access to their own
cultural products and knowledge.
2. Paul Gauguin’s Poèmes barbares and Roger Fry
No late nineteenth-century European artist practiced cultural
appropriation more blatantly than Paul Gauguin (1848-1903). In
1896, during his second visit to the islands in Oceania known as
French Polynesia, Gauguin made a painting, now in the Harvard
Art Museums, to which he gave the title inscribed in the upper
left corner, Poèmes barbares, sometimes translated as “Savage
Poems”[7] (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Paul Gauguin, Poèmes barbares, 1896, oil on
canvas, Harvard Art Museums/Fogg Museum, Bequest from
the collection of Maurice Wertheim, Class of 1906. Photo ©
President and Fellows of Harvard College.

Gauguin derived the title from a collection of poems rst
published in 1862 by Charles Leconte de Lisle under the title
Poèsies Barbares, but which he renamed Poèmes barbares
when he reissued the collection with a di erent publisher in
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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1871.[8] The poet chose this revised title to be a contrast to his
collection published in 1852, Poèmes antiques, that had been
largely inspired by the cultures of classical antiquity and ancient
India.[9] In Poèmes barbares, Leconte de Lisle evoked the
mythologies of non-classical—”primitive”—cultures, including
Oceania. Among them is a poem with the title, “La Genèse
polynésienne” (Polynesian Creation). Some scholars have
proposed that Gauguin’s painting follows this poem in evoking
the Tahitian account of the creation of the universe, the gods,
and humankind by the creator deity called, in Tahitian, Ta’aroa,
who is represented by the gure at lower left.[10] This creation
account has equivalents in most, if not all, southern and eastern
Oceanic societies, from Aotearoa New Zealand to Hawai’i. It is
not my purpose to elucidate the iconography of this painting.
Rather, I want to examine how this work intersects with the
aesthetic ideas of Roger Fry.
What is the connection between Poèmes barbares and Roger
Fry? Admittedly, it is tenuous. In 1910, Fry, having quit his
position at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York the
previous year, organized an exhibition at the Grafton Gallery,
London.[11] The Grafton Gallery had long shown a tolerance
towards what has come to be seen, from a normative art
historical perspective, as progressive art, showing, for instance,
French Impressionist works in 1905 before these were generally
admired. In 1910, it went a step further and hosted a loan
exhibition conceived by Fry comprising paintings from France
that he considered to be even more radical. In focusing on the
work of Paul Cézanne, Paul Gauguin, and Vincent van Gogh, in
particular, Fry coined the designation “Post-Impressionist,” using
it in the title of his exhibition.[12] As art historian Anna
Gruetzner Robins writes in her study of the exhibition: “What
cannot be disputed is that Manet and the Post- Impressionists,
through many canonical exhibits, ensured that Cézanne,
Gauguin, Van Gogh, Matisse, Picasso and to some extent Seurat
were established as pre-eminent gures in the landscape of
Modernism as perceived in the Anglophone art world. From
there on it was impossible to ignore them.”[13]

https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/

5/22

10/5/2020

https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/

Figure 2. Exhibition poster, Manet and the PostImpressionists, Grafton Gallery, London, 191011.

Gauguin’s Poèmes barbares dominates the publicity poster for
the exhibition (Figure 2). It is hard to believe that Fry did not
choose it for this purpose. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Fry,
who was an accomplished graphic designer in addition to being
a painter and print-maker, did not design the poster himself. He
saw value in what he termed “that ultra-primitive directness of
vision” that he detected in the works of those whom he at times
termed “savages.”[14] In his writings on sub-Saharan African art,
in particular, he promoted an awareness of that speci c value of
what, at the time, was termed “the primitive” as a way of
furthering the status of the works of contemporaneous
European artists who had sought inspiration in sub-Saharan
African and Oceanic material culture. This presumably led to the
choice of a painting for the poster that makes explicit the
connection between innovative European practice and so-called
primitive sources of inspiration. The use of Gauguin’s Poèmes
barbares on the poster implies not only that it held a special
place in Fry’s conception of the exhibition, but that it was
actually included in the exhibition. However, that appears not to
have been the case. Robins concludes, “it is possible that the
picture was promised but did not reach the exhibition since
there does not appear to be any reference to it in the extensive
press commentary.”[15] I have been unable to discover
unequivocally by whom it might have been promised. It may
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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have been owned at that time by the Munich banker, Alfred
Wol . The painting had been through the Hôtel Drouot auction
rooms in Paris in 1906, and was acquired directly or indirectly by
Wol . Wol collected avant-garde French art with the advice of
the Belgian designer, Henry van de Velde.[16] By 1912, little
more than a year after the Grafton Gallery exhibition closed,
Poèmes barbares was in the collection of Michael Sadler.
Michael Sadler was a historian and educational theorist who had
been appointed vice-chancellor of the University of Leeds in
northern England in 1911. Sadler became president of the Leeds
Art Club, founded in 1903. The club was a proponent of the
most avant-garde European art of the day from France and,
especially, Germany.[17] Sadler owned not only Gauguin’s
Poèmes barbares but his Vision after the Sermon (National
Gallery of Scotland, Edinburgh). He was a notable supporter of
Wassily Kandinsky, owning Fragment 2 for Composition VII, of
1913 (Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Bu alo, NY). Indeed, Sadler’s
enthusiastic support of German Expressionism in Kandinsky’s
Munich acknowledged the Bavarian city as of an importance in
the production of avant-garde art equal to, if not greater than,
that of Paris. The Leeds Arts Club explored progressive work
even more outrageous to contemporary European taste than
that championed by Fry, who focused on artists in Paris. And
Sadler was undoubtedly acquainted with the Munich art
collector, Alfred Wol .
In Gauguin’s Poèmes barbares we see a prime example of the
work of European artists who found inspiration in items from
Oceania and sub-Saharan Africa. This is a familiar topic in
European art history. Yet why should Gauguin and Picasso,
emulating the work of Oceanic and African makers, be thought
of as admirably inventive and innovative, whereas the work of
Oceanic and African artists subsequently nding inspiration in
that of Gauguin and Picasso be considered derivative? At one
time, the argument that the attention of European artists to the
work of supposedly primitive makers sanctioned, in turn,
viewers’ attention to such work, was a new and, to an extent, a
liberating argument. That argument was made by Roger Fry in
his collection of his essays, Vision and Design, published in 1920.
We should note, though, that Fry’s sympathetic observations
regarding so-called primitive art were con ned to material from
Africa. He did not address Oceania or other non-Western areas
of the world often described as primitive at that time.
3. Fry on “Bushman Paintings,” and “Negro Sculpture”
Fry’s rst published thoughts on African art concerned drawings
by members of the hunter-gatherer peoples of southern Africa,
today predominantly grouped in Botswana and Namibia and
known as the San, but then as Bushmen. Fry’s thoughts
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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appeared originally as a book review, “Bushman Paintings,” in
The Burlington Magazine in 1910.[18] In 1920, Fry visited an
exhibition of sub-Saharan African sculpture at the Chelsea Book
Club with his friend, the author Virginia Woolf, and published a
review in The Athenaeum as “Negro Sculpture at the Chelsea
Book Club.”[19] In the same year, he included both short essays
(the former retitled “The Art of the Bushmen”) in Vision and
Design. This book is an incremental argument about how
discerning what Fry termed “that ultra-primitive directness of
vision” found in African art can open viewers’ minds to related
qualities in European Post-Impressionist art.[20] As such, even if
the book invites attention to African material, it remains an
example of the continuing subordination of subaltern cultural
items to European values. In “Bushman Paintings,” Fry argues
that in the process of making art, “the retinal image passed into
a clear memory picture with scarcely any intervening mental
process.”[21] This resulted, he claims, in images that incorporate
the kind of foreshortening that many of his contemporaries
thought absent from what he terms “early art,” the term he uses
to refer to Assyrian, Egyptian, archaic Greek, and Neolithic art.
[22] He suggests that the art of the San, by contrast, is similar to
the art of Paleolithic peoples, exempli ed by the cave paintings
of Altamira, in that it can depict appearances because the
“concepts were not so clearly grasped as to have begun to
interfere with perception.”[23] He argues that in such works, the
maker depended on an “immediacy and rapidity of
transcription” rather than on “express[ing] a mental image
which is coloured by his conceptual habits.”[24] Early Greek
artists, on the other hand, relied on the representation of visual
concepts and showed what they knew to be the case regarding
what they represented, rather than simply what they saw. Far
from lauding the Greeks and denigrating the Africans, Fry points
to the art practice of the San—”what we call the lowest of
savages”[25] —as the very mode of perception and execution
that the Impressionists were seeking in their paintings: that is,
“that ultra-primitive directness of vision.”
“Negro Sculpture,” written ten years later, makes a di erent
point. It is a salutary blast aimed at the unthinking valuation of
the European sculptural tradition derived from ancient Greece.
Here, Fry lauds sub-Saharan wood sculpture for what he terms
its “expressive plastic form” and its “complete plastic
freedom.”[26] Its gures, he argues, are wholly free in
conception from the predominantly two-dimensional
constraints of the bas-relief that he argues characterize Greek
and subsequent European statuary. Although Fry praises the
qualities he discerns in sub-Saharan wood sculpture, ascribing a
“creative aesthetic impulse” to their makers and associating
them with the “most exquisite sensibility and the nest taste,”
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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he nonetheless holds that “[i]t is for want of a conscious critical
sense and the intellectual powers of comparison that the negro
has failed to create one of the great cultures of the world.”[27]
It is not my purpose simply to echo the observations of scholars
such as Marianna Torgovnick, who rightly points out the
undertow of early twentieth-century racist assumptions in Fry’s
remarks on African art.[28] Neither am I concerned to do more
than merely mention that Fry’s striking enthusiasm for West
African sculpture in wood was shared by a small number of
European and American taste-makers, who, although informed
by di erent philosophical considerations, shared with Fry an
interest in emphasizing the formal properties of artworks.
Readers get a glimpse of this shared concern in the sole
illustration accompanying “Negro Sculpture,” in Fry’s Vision and
Design: Plate III (Figure 3).
The item reproduced was subsequently identi ed as a Sãdo’o
Society ritual female gure made by a member of the Senufo
nation in Côte d’Ivoire in the late nineteenth or early twentieth
century. Fry simply captioned it “Negro Sculpture” and
“Collection Guillaume” on the plate in his book. “Guillaume” was
the Parisian dealer, Paul Guillaume, who championed African
sculpture, and from whom the pharmaceutical entrepreneurturned- collector and art educator, Albert Barnes, bought nearly
all the African works that he acquired for his institution in
suburban Philadelphia, beginning in 1922.[29] The Senufo
female gure is among the works Barnes acquired from
Guillaume. Even though the French designation l’art nègre
included Oceanic works during this period, Barnes acquired just
one Oceanic piece, apparently believing it to have been African
and Fry con ned his brief discussions to works from Africa.[30]

https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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Figure 3. Senufo artist (Côte d’Ivoire),
Seated female gure of the Sãdo’o
Society, late 19th–early 20th century,
wood, Barnes Foundation,
Philadelphia, as illustrated in Roger
Fry, Vision and Design (1920), Plate III.

4. The decolonizing response
When trying to establish grounds for why people from
hegemonic societies might pay attention to works from
subaltern communities in their own right, the familiar European
appeal to works from both Oceania and sub- Saharan Africa as a
means of sanctioning certain kinds of European art practice,
outlined above, is beside the point. Two factors that might help
promote ambition to respond across cultural boundaries meet
eetingly in the context of Gauguin’s painting, Poèmes barbares.
They are, rst, Roger Fry’s aesthetics, regardless of the range of
artworks, whether African or European, to which he appealed;
and, second, imagining a view not from the European world to
Oceania, but in the other direction, from Oceania, such that
European art by Gauguin and his European contemporaries
diminish in importance and Oceanic things seen in an Oceanic
light reappear. We might term this a decolonizing response.
An inkling of a decolonizing response came to my mind when
viewing the exhibition Gauguin, Tahiti at the Museum of Fine
Arts, Boston, in 2004, also shown at the Grand Palais, Paris.[31]
The curators, George Shackelford and Claire Frèches-Thory,
included considerable numbers of works from Tahiti, the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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Marquesas, and elsewhere in Oceania. They did so to invite
comparisons with numerous works in various media—
paintings, prints, wood, ceramics—by Gauguin. The works from
Oceania were there in order to validate Gauguin’s inspiration,
yet on this occasion they overshadowed Gauguin’s own e orts
at anything other than painting, drawing, and printmaking.
Although one can admire Gauguin’s work in all the media he
employed, a work in the exhibition such as the Māori carved
wooden canoe stern (Musée national de la Marine, Paris) has an
aesthetic presence just as compelling as anything that Gauguin
himself fashioned in this medium.[32] The presence of
Gauguin’s art—art that in other circumstances I have admired—
was on this occasion a distraction. Rather than enhance
Gauguin’s achievement, the Oceanic items drew attention to its
shortcomings, and I found myself wishing that his works could
be purged from the galleries to leave the Oceanic pieces there
alone. In this exhibition, Gauguin’s art had inadvertently and
unfortunately taken on the role of epitomizing arrogant
European intrusion in Tahiti, the Marquesas, and Oceania as a
whole.
Do Western hegemonic institutions invariably have to
subordinate works from subaltern societies to the role of
sanctioning Western art practice, as in the case of Gauguin,
Tahiti? Not necessarily. In 2006, anthropologist Steven Hooper
organized the exhibition Paci c Encounters: Art and Divinity in
Polynesia, 1760-1860 at the Sainsbury Centre, University of East
Anglia, Norwich, England.[33] The Robert and Lisa Sainsbury
Collection, given to the university in 1973, intermingles works of
European Modernism with ancient Mediterranean, African, and
Oceanic pieces. Its explicit purpose is to draw attention to the
formal properties of all. The Sainsburys owed their inspiration in
part to Fry’s principles, including an invitation to “dispense once
and for all with the idea of likeness to Nature, of correctness or
incorrectness, as a test, and consider only whether the
emotional elements inherent in natural form are adequately
discovered.”[34] The Sainsbury Collection Website states that it
“uniquely presents art as a universal global phenomenon.”[35]
However, its implicit purpose is to sanction European
Modernism.
Hooper’s exhibition transcended the premise of the institution
that produced it. In Paci c Encounters, there was no overt
intrusion of European Modernism. The encounters were of
three kinds: rst, among the inhabitants of Oceania themselves;
second, between these inhabitants on the one hand, and
Europeans, including European North Americans, on the other
who visited Oceania and intruded increasingly from the mideighteenth century onwards; and, third, between the array of
extraordinary and very varied things made and rst used by
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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residents of Oceania then on view, and the exhibition visitors
whom those things encountered and who encountered them.
[36] Hooper eschewed pressing these things into the service of
an art history concerned solely with gauging artistic progress
from Impressionism through Post-Impressionism to the
beginnings of Modernism. He also avoided a purely
ethnographic presentation, for he skillfully invited aesthetic
attention to the things he showed. Unlike the Musée du quai
Branly that opened in Paris in the same year, 2006, dedicated to
the so-called arts premiers of Africa, Oceania, and the Americas,
there was little sense of colonial superiority in Paci c
Encounters.[37] Indeed, the exhibition opened the way for an
engagement not only with Oceanic things, many of them
invested with mana (spiritual power), but with the ideas of
Paci c thinkers. It was as close to a decolonizing project as one
could imagine in the heart of a society that had thrived by
means of colonial exploitation.
I cannot claim that Fry’s ideas directly a ected Hooper’s in his
production of Paci c Encounters, but neither does Hooper’s
work implicitly reject Fry’s ideas out of hand. Commentators,
anxious to avoid complicity in racism, have accused Fry, among
others, of having been a racist imperialist.[38] While Fry, albeit
equivocally, shared certain racist assumptions, to follow this
course entails the risk of rejecting those parts of Fry’s thinking
that might help to promote attention to sub-Saharan and
Oceanic aesthetically charged items without reference to works
in the European tradition.
5. Empathy in Fry’s aesthetics
There is variety of opinion and there are disagreements among
Oceanic thinkers, but a truly post-colonial Oceania—hard to
imagine at present—free of the taint of ascriptions of the
primitive, whether in the past or present, is at long last
conceivable. For people of European origin, this change entails
setting obsessions with the art of their own makers, that of
Picasso, Gauguin, and the rest, in perspective. Perhaps
surprisingly, Roger Fry, who subordinated the qualities he
genuinely valued in African art to the promotion of European
Post- Impressionism, can o er help in grasping aspects of the
peculiar qualities of non-European creations. In his 1909 article
in The New Quarterly, “An Essay in Aesthetics,” subsequently
included in Vision and Design, he points to what he conceived of
as the purpose of the artwork:
But in our reaction to a work of art …
there is the consciousness of purpose, the consciousness of a
peculiar relation
of sympathy with the man who made this thing in order to
arouse precisely the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-870/
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sensations we experience. And when we come to the higher
works of art, where
sensations are so arranged that they arouse in us deep
emotions, this feeling
of a special tie with the man who expressed them becomes very
strong. We feel
that he has expressed something which was latent in us all the
time, but which
we never realised, that he has revealed us to ourselves in
revealing himself.
And this recognition of purpose is, I believe, an essential part of
the
aesthetic judgment proper.[39]

The notion that an artwork connects the mind of the maker with
that of the percipient informs work in the philosophy and
history of art, both earlier and later than Fry’s. Fry, himself,
acknowledged his debt to Leo Tolstoy, who published What is
Art? in 1897, in spite of “disagreeing with almost all his
results.”[40] John Dewey also espoused an expressive theory of
art. His arguments likely encouraged Albert Barnes, whom he
supported intellectually, to see value in the sub-Saharan African
art that we have seen him acquire. In Art as Experience,
moreover, Dewey takes issue with Fry’s near total subordination
of “subject matter”—that which is represented in an artwork—to
purely formal properties and his discounting of artists’
experiences prior to creating artworks as informing those
artworks.[41] Yet all these thinkers agree, in outline, that the
artwork connects the mind of the maker with that of the
percipient. A later, prominent advocate of this contention was
Richard Wollheim, for whom the “marked surface must be the
conduit along which the mental state of the artist makes itself
felt within the mind of the spectator if the result is to be that the
spectator grasps the meaning of the picture.”[42] However,
whereas Wollheim, and others who have followed his lead,
believe that the “mental state of the artist makes itself felt within
the mind of the spectator,” Fry evokes something di erent that
is less directly communicative; that is, a “feeling of a special tie”
that the percipient can come to sense between herself and the
maker based on self-realization prompted by the work that
evokes this feeling. This is a variant of the in uential notion of
empathetic connection (Einfühling) proposed by Robert Vischer
and taken up by his father, Friedrich Theodor Vischer, notably in
his 1887 article, “Das Symbol,” even though his claims largely
concern the putative relationship between the percipient, the
representation and its referent rather than its maker.[43]
Insofar as Fry postulates the possibility of evoking an
empathetic connection, a “feeling of a special tie,” on the part of
the (colonizing) percipient with the (colonized) maker, his idea
promises help. But we should temper optimism with caution.
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Whether such an aesthetically generated emotion can actually
deliver on a promise of a revision of attitude, on the part of the
hegemonic subject towards the subaltern subject, is open to
question and generates a skeptical response among many
subalterns and their supporters.[44] Furthermore, there is a
possible serious aw in the ascription of e cacy to Fry’s claims.
It seems likely that by drawing inferences from their visual
material alone, Fry had failed to grasp that the San are no less
dependent on cognitive processes and visual conventions than
any other cultural group. In claiming that “the retinal image
passed into a clear memory picture with scarcely any
intervening mental process,” he may have mistaken what in
actuality are cognitive processes and distinctive San visual
conventions for a supposed “ultra-primitive directness of vision,”
partly as a consequence of wishful thinking. Reliance on
empathy in this instance may have come to naught in terms of
analysis. Nonetheless, such a call for human empathy has a
place in ongoing attempts to overturn the pernicious appeal to
the primitive, in the denigratory sense that was in common use
prior to the publication, in 1927, of Primitive Art, in which
anthropologist Franz Boas discredited the idea of “primitive”
humans as being inferior to “civilized” humans by arguing for a
species of cultural relativism, suggesting that human
communities have developed equally but in distinct manners
that are the consequences of historic conditions rather than
genetic predispositions.[45]
If rejecting Fry’s ideas outright is not an adequate response on
the part of those who enjoy hegemonic advantage, neither is an
exclusive reliance on his appeal to empathetic connection. If an
appeal to empathetic connection has a place in articulating
aesthetic responses to items made within subaltern groups, so
does it in attempting to come to terms with ideas expressed by
members of those groups in other ways. Hegemonic theorizing
routinely ignores the work of thinkers from subaltern
communities. This is the very thinking that Europeans most
need to address if they are to make any attempt to expand
upon their own culturally circumscribed viewpoint. With regard
to Oceania, I can do no more than signal the contributions of a
few among the following Oceanic thinkers: Epeli Hau’ofa,
Hūfanga ‘Ōkusitino Māhina, Paul Tapsell, and Albert Tuaopepe
Wendt.
For instance, Māhina, concurring with Hau’ofa, sees time and
space in a manner di erent from Europeans. Māhina sees
Oceanic people “walk forward into the past and walk backward
into the future, both taking place in the present, where past and
future are constantly mediated in the ever-transforming
present.”[46] This is an epitome of Tongan concepts of
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temporality and spatiality, called tā and vā, that articulate
human beings’ experience of their place in the world.[47]
Unsurprisingly, tradition has a particularly urgent place in the
work of all these Oceanic thinkers. Māori scholar Paul Tapsell
writes of the return in 1993 of an especially important taonga
(living ancestral physical item) to his iwi (tribe), Te Arawa. This is
a dogskin cloak called Te Kahumamae o Pareraututu (“the cloak
of pain of Pareraututu”) that had been in the Auckland War
Memorial Museum since the 1870s. In spite of the aesthetic
characteristics that sustain attention to this exquisitely made,
mana-charged item, he stresses the importance of Māori
ancestral values, in particular, whakapapa, or genealogical
order, over the aesthetic and historical values that attract
Europeans.[48] Yet various Oceanic thinkers do not regard
traditional values as immutable. For Epeli Hau’ofa, “Tradition
was not the arid, formulaic routine of what had gone before. For
Epeli, it was a living, breathing organism of the present day. It
drew from the past, yet was neither bound nor limited by it.”[49]
Neither do all Oceanic thinkers see the cultural groups that
sustain traditional values as necessarily unchanging. Some go so
far as to deny that shared ethnicity is the sole basis for adhering
to or understanding such values. For example, Samoan thinker,
Albert Tuaopepe Wendt, argues that access to a culture is not a
matter of ethnic belonging. He writes: “To advocate that in order
to be a true Samoan, for example, one must be fully-blooded
Samoan and behave/think/dance/talk/dress/and believe in a
certain prescribed way (and that the prescribed way has not
changed since time immemorial) is being racist, callously
totalitarian, and stupid.” He continues, “This is a prescription for
cultural stagnation, an invitation for a culture to choke in its own
body odour, juices, and excreta.”[50] If Fry, an elite member of a
hegemonic culture, holds out the possibility, albeit far from
perfectly, that those in one culture can grasp aspects of another,
so do some members of subaltern cultures.
Such a forthright rejection of social, cultural, and ethnic
isolationism and stasis among scholars beyond the European
mainstream is not found in Oceania alone. Distinguished
Caribbean scholars, such as the Jamaican sociologist and
cultural theorist, Stuart Hall and the Martiniquan literary
theorist, Édouard Glissant, challenged assumptions regarding
the static cultural identity of communities. Hall proposes a uid
notion of cultural belonging in what he terms “diasporic
identity,” while Glissant propounds an idea of relation—
relational belonging—as opposed to the cultural and social
isolation induced by an essentializing conception of cultural
identity.[51] It is far from inconceivable that parts of Fry’s
thinking might be redeployed as a productive element of
analysis in terms of relation.
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6. The perils of appropriation, and the persistence of the
“primitive”
Placing con dence in empathy o ers no easy solution, for the
question arises: How can European people who enjoy all kinds
of hegemonic advantages engage with Oceanic art and thought,
and the art and thought of other disadvantaged peoples,
without appropriating them injuriously or o ensively?[52] There
are members of subaltern communities who deny that
hegemonic peoples can ever respond to their cultural
productions empathetically or without appropriating them.
While we should not assume that some small degree of
empathy might be available without instruction, correction, and
hard work, for a community to assume a position of complete
cultural isolation, by denying that it can be the subject of
empathetic engagement by others, seems a denial of a basic
human capability. Such a hyper-defensive attitude may be
understandable as a consequence of the experience of injustice
and inequity over generations, but it leads to extremes of
identity politics that can seek to impose limits on
comprehension and expression intolerably. As one graduate
student put it: “I am a pregnant African American Jewish lesbian:
Can I understand and speak only on behalf of pregnant African
American Jewish lesbians?” Even while guarding against
appropriation, aesthetic apprehension with an empathetic
component has a distinct role to play in overcoming social
isolation. As philosopher of Black aesthetics Paul C. Taylor puts
it, “the aesthetic can be a resource for moving, as María Lugones
and Peta Bowden might put it, from perceiving racial ‘others’
arrogantly to perceiving them lovingly, with the ethical
attentiveness that combats reductionism and
objecti cation.”[53] Aesthetics has a role to play in postcolonial
reconciliation, if, even selectively, such a thing might be possible.
Unfortunately, pre-Boasian usage still has its supporters. At the
annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association in
2018, the respondent to a paper on Nietzsche and the origin of
obligation mentioned “primitive human beings.” When asked,
“Who or what is a primitive human being?” the respondent’s
answer was: “A member of the species Homo sapiens who has
not developed the ability to function in the complex
contemporary world,” to which the questioner’s riposte was: “If
you were to nd yourself among the Asmat people of Papua,
might you not take some time to develop an ability to function
in their world?” The primitive in some pre-Boasian sense
remains alive and well. It may fade further if Fry’s admittedly
awed appeal to human empathy, by evoking “that ultraprimitive directness of vision,” can serve to prompt serious
engagement with works by Oceanic and sub-Saharan African
makers and thinkers. Fry’s aesthetics o ers no one-stop x to
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correcting the predominant hegemonic valuation of subaltern
aesthetically charged items. On the contrary, we have seen that
his argument subordinated such works to his championing of
European Modernism. Yet aesthetic apprehension, with an
empathetic component, has a distinct role to play in overcoming
the social isolation of cultural groups. Fry’s attention to
subaltern works in the context of an aesthetics that postulates
the “feeling of a special tie” on the part of the percipient to the
maker paves the way to an opening of hearts as well as eyes.
[54]
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